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Holdsworth: Real Property - Intent of the Parties - The Focal Point of Interp

REAL PROPERTY-Intent Of The Parties-The Focal Point of
Interpreting The Installment Land Contract. McKone v. Guertzgen,
811 P.2d 728 (Wyo. 1991).
In May of 1981, Appellant Robert 0. McKone agreed to sell
certain real property located in Thermopolis, Wyoming, to Melvin
and Claudia Guertzgen.1 The parties entered into an installment land
contract 2 whereby the Guertzgens agreed to pay McKone a total of
$100,000 for the property. The agreement required the Guertzgens to
make a down payment of $40,000, with the balance to be paid to
McKone in ten annual installments of $6000 each, plus interest. 3 Under
the terms of the agreement, the Guertzgens were entitled to possession
of the property, while the title was to remain in escrow in the name
until all payments had been made in accordance with the
of McKone
4
contract.
After taking possession, the Guertzgens converted the property
from a gas station to a liquor store and lounge. 5 In December of
1989, with 18 months remaining on the contract, 6 the parties received
a letter from the Thermopolis Fire Marshal, ordering the removal of
underground gasoline storage tanks located on the property.7 The
parties were unable to reach an agreement as to who should be
responsible for the removal of the tanks. 8
The Guertzgens failed to pay the installment which came due in
June, 1989, 9 after which McKone threatened to declare a default on

1. Brief of Appellant at 2, McKone v. Guertzgen, 811 P.2d 728 (Vyo. 1991)(No. 90247)[hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
2. Also known as a contract for deed. See infra text accompanying notes 27-49.
3. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, exhibit "A" para. 1.
The purchase price for the... real property, together with the improvements thereon,
is $100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Dollars), payable as follows: A. $1,000.00
was paid March 15, 1981, receipt of which is acknowledged by Seller. B. $39,000.00
payable June 15, 1981. C. $60,000.00 payable in ten annual installments, together
with interest at a rate of 12% (twelve percent) Per annum on all balances owing
from time to time, beginning June 15, 1982....
Id.
4. Id.
5. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 2.
6. By December of 1989, the Guertzgens had paid principle and interest totalling $117.280
to McKone. The balance due on the property was approximately $12,000. Brief of Appellant,
supra note 1, exhibit G.
7. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 2. The fuel tanks were the remnants of the
property's prior use as a gasoline station. The fuel tanks were no longer in use at the time
the parties entered into the contract. See infra text accompanying notes 88-91.
8. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 2.
9. Id. at 1. The record is unclear as to why the Guertzgens failed to make the 1989
payment. In his dissent, Justice Urbigkit implied that the payment was withheld as a result of
the dispute over removal of the tanks. McKone, 811 P.2d at 731. However, the Fire Marshal
did not notify the parties about the fuel tank problem until December 1989, six months after
the payment presumably should have been made. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 2.
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the contract if payment was not made.1 0 In response, the Guertzgens
filed a complaint in the Fifth Judicial District for the County of Hot
Springs, asking the court to enjoin McKone from declaring a default
on the contract pending a resolution as to responsibility for removal
of the fuel tanks." On January 31, 1990, the district court granted
a temporary restraining order, but required the Guertzgens to deposit
1989 payment with the court pending a resolution of
the delinquent
2
the dispute.'
On February 28, 1990, the district court issued an order stating:
"If the court finds the Defendant [McKone] is the owner of the
property which is the subject of an Agreement for Warranty Deed
between the Plaintiffs and Defendant .

.

. [t]he Defendant shall pay

for the removal of the underground storage tanks. . . . "'13 The parties
then submitted memoranda, exhibits, and a set of stipulated facts to
the district court.' 4 The Guertzgens argued that because McKone was
the legal owner of the property, he should bear the cost of compliance
with the Fire Marshal's order. McKone contended that under the
terms of the Uniform Fire Code, the Guertzgens were the "owners"
of the property and thus responsible for bringing the land into
compliance with the code.', The district court framed the issues as
follows: "[W]ho are the owners of the property and who must bear
the responsibility and expense of removing the underground storage
tanks and restoring the property."' 7 The district court ruled:
[T]he Plaintiffs have an equitable interest in the real property
which is the subject of this dispute ....

[Tihe Defendants

have the legal interest in the property since they are the ones
who can mortgage, convey or otherwise encumber the
property.... [T]he legal title of the property does not pass
from the Defendants until the full purchase price has been
paid, which has not occurred in this case.' 8
The district court then concluded: "The Defendants are the legal owners of the subject property ...

and are the party responsible for

10. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, exhibit G.
11. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 1.
12. Id.
13. Id. exhibit C.
14. Id. exhibit D. The parties stipulated, inter alia, as follows: "[P]rior to May 9, 1981,
the underground storage tanks had been decommissioned by a prior Contract for Deed person,
not the the [sic] Plaintiffs or the Defendant, and have not been used since that time. 2. That
the underground storage tanks were not used after May 9, 1981." Id.
15. McKone, 811 P.2d at 729.
16. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, exhibit G. See infra note 24 and accompanying
text.
17. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, exhibit G.
18. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/9

2

Holdsworth: Real Property - Intent of the Parties - The Focal Point of Interp

1993

CASENOTES

compliance with the removal of the underground tanks."' 19
McKone filed a motion to reconsider, upon which the district
court again ruled that McKone was the legal owner of the property
and was responsible for removal of the storage tanks. 20 McKone then
filed an appeal with the Wyoming Supreme Court, presenting, inter
alia,21 the following issues:
1. Whether the District Court erred when it looked beyond
the Contract for Deed to determine the responsibilities of the
parties as to the Fire Marshal's request to remove underground fuel storage tanks? 2. Whether the District Court erred
when it looked beyond the Contract for Deed and the Fire
Code to determine the responsibilities of the parties as to [sic]
Fire Marshal's request to remove underground fuel storage
tanks?"
In a three-two decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
the agreement of the parties did not address responsibility under the
circumstances, thus entitling the court to look "elsewhere". 23 The
court turned to the language of the Uniform Fire Code,24 and concluded that according to the Code, both McKone and the Guertzgens

19. Id.
20. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, exhibit F. In the order, the district court judge
stated: "The Court, after hearing the arguments of counsel on the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the Defendant, finds: 1. The decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court in Olds v. Little
Horse Creek Cattle Co., 140 P. 1004 (1914) controls in this case; and 2. That the Defendant
is the owner of the property."
21. McKone presented two additional issues to the court:
3. Whether the District Court erred when it relied upon Olds v. Little Horse [Creek]
Cattle Co.,[22 Wyo. 336, 140 P. 1004, (1914)] as authority when it determined the
responsibilities of the parties as to the Fire Marshal's request to remove underground
should be overfuel storage tanks? 4. Whether Olds v. Little Horse Cattle Co ....
ruled if it is determinative of the responsibilities of parties as to contracts for deed
between individuals?
McKone, 811 P.2d at 729.
22. McKone, 811 P.2d at 729.
23. Id. at 729-30.
24. The relevant provision of the Code reads:
Any order or notice issued or served as provided in this code shall be complied with
by the owner, operator, occupant or other person responsible for the condition or
violation to which the order or notice pertains. In cases of extreme danger to persons
or property immediate compliance shall be required. If the building or other premises
is owned by one person and occupied by another, under lease or otherwise, and the
order or notice requires additions or changes in the building or premises such as
would immediately become real estate and be the property of the owner of the building or premises, such order or notice shall be complied with by the owner unless
the owner and occupant have otherwise agreed between themselves, in which event
the occupant shall comply.
Uniform Fire Code Sec. 3.102 (1979).
The Code defines "owner" as follows: "OWNER includes his duly authorized agent or
attorney, a purchaser, devisee, fiduciary and a person having vested or contingent interest in
the property in question." Uniform Fire Code Sec 9.117 (1979).
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were "owners" of the property.Y However, because McKone owned
the property when the fuel tanks were abandoned, the court held that
McKone should bear the cost of the removing the tanks.26
This casenote briefly examines the installment land contract and
its treatment by the Wyoming Supreme Court. It then discusses basic

rules of contract interpretation as established by Wyoming case law,
with emphasis placed on the method and importance of establishing
the intent of the contracting parties. Finally, it evaluates the court's
application of the principles of contract interpretation to the installment land contract at the center of the dispute in McKone v. Guertzgen.
BACKGROUND

The Installment Land Contract
The installment land contract is the most commonly used substitute for a mortgage, 27 and often allows a person who does not
qualify for traditional bank financing to purchase property.2 In the
typical installment land contract, the seller (as opposed to a commercial lender) finances the purchase of property by allowing the
buyer to pay for the property in installments. The buyer is usually
entitled to immediate possession of the property, while legal title remains in the name of the seller until the entire purchase price has
been paid.2 9 Aside from the seller retaining legal title, the oft cited
difference between the installment land contract and the mortgage is
"the ease and economy by which the purchaser's interest may be
eliminated in the event of his default."' 3
When the buyer defaults on an installment land contract, traditional remedies allow the vendor to sue "(1) for the installments,
which are due with interest thereon; (2) for specific performance of
the contract; (3) for damages for the breach; (4) to foreclose his
vendee's rights; (5) to quiet title; or if he should desire, he may merely

25. McKone, 811 P.2d at 730.
26. Id.
27. GRANT S. NELSON & DA.E A. WHrrmAN, REAL ESTATE FANCE LAW § 3.26 (2d ed.,
lawyer's ed. 1985).
28. Jeffrey W. King, Comment, Forfeiture: The Anomaly of the Land Sale Contract,
41 ALB. L. REV. 71, 75 (1977). See also BAXTER DuNAWAY, THE LAW OF DiSTRESSED REAL
ESTATE § 10.02 (1988).
29. NELSON & WrrmAN, supra note 27, § 3.26. The Wyoming Supreme Court characterized this difference as follows: "The fundamental difference distinguishing a mortgage from
an installment land contract, at least in states applying a lien theory to mortgages, is that, in
a mortgage, fee has vested in the purchaser/mortgager." Metropolitan Mortgage & Sec. Co.
v. Belgarde, 816 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 1991)(quoting Cliff & Co., Ltd. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d
595, 601 (Wyo. 1989)).

30.

King, supra note 28, at 74.
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rescind the contract." 3 1 Of these options, the suit to quiet title is
commonly preferred.32 The other remedies are disfavored by the vendor for two reasons: first, they often involve time consuming litigation, a pitfall the vendor is presumably trying to avoid by using
the installment land contract. 3 Second, remedies such as damages for
breach and specific performance are based on the assumption that
the vendee has sufficient assets available to satisfy a money judgement.34 However, the nature of the installment land contract as a low
equity method of purchase (often utilized by low-income vendees unable to qualify for conventional financing) calls this assumption into
question.

3
1

The action to quiet title "is usually an outgrowth of the vendor's

claim to his purported rights under a forfeiture clause. 36 This forfeiture clause, contained in most installment land contracts, provides
that upon failure to make timely payment, the seller has the right,
with or without due process of law, to declare the contract void, take
immediate possession of the property, and hold payments previously

made as either liquidated damages or rent. 37 Based on such a clause,
the buyer under an installment land contract, unlike a mortgagor,
may have no right of redemption after default.38 Indeed, the installment land contract is notorious for visiting harsh results upon the
unfortunate buyer who falls behind on his or her payments.

9

31. Grant S. Nelson and Dale A. Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National
Viewpoint, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 541, 542 (1977) (citing Terence C. Porter, Comment, Installment Contractsfor the Sale of Land in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REV. 240, 243 (1959)).
32. Id.
33. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 27, § 3.26.
34. Id. § 3.32.
35. See King, supra note 28, at 75.
36. Nelson and Whitman, supra note 31, at 542.
37. Id. For example, the forfeiture clause contained in the McKone contract read:
[I]nthe event Buyer fails to rectify and remedy [delinquency] within 60 days after
written notice is mailed ... Seller shall have the right to declare this contract ended
and null and void and of no further force and effect and to enter upon the premises
andtake [sic] immediate possession thereof, with or without due process of law, and
to recover by distress or otherwise upon the premises all interest which shall have
accrued upon this contract up to the date of declaring it void and declare all payments
made to such date to be rent for the use and occupation of the premises and property
of the Seller ....
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, exhibit A para 15.
38. Wyoming is a "lien theory" mortgage state, providing by statute that a mortgagor
has a right of redemption after foreclosure. Wyo. STAT. § 1-18-103(a) (1987).
39. A commentator illustrated the problem with several examples, including the following:
An elderly couple in Binghamton, unable to obtain a conventional mortgage,
bought their home under a land sale contract. Nine years later, experiencing temporary financial problems, they fell a month behind in their payments. As a result,
they lost the home and all they had invested in it.
A mother of three, on welfare, could not resist the opportunity to be a homeowner and signed a land contract to purchase a run-down home in Schenectady.
After four years of meeting her monthly payments and repairing the heating and
plumbing at great expense, she became unable to meet her monthly installments.
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The Installment Land Contract In Wyoming
Wyoming "is one of the states where a seller is most likely to
40
be able to enforce a forfeiture clause in an installment land contract''
The general approach of the Wyoming Supreme Court has been to
treat the installment land contract like any other contract. 4 Consequently, installment land contracts in Wyoming have traditionally been
enforced according to their terms. 42 The court has stated that under
certain conditions, an equitable mortgage may be found, based on
the intent of the parties: "[I1n order for a court to find a mortgage,
it must be shown that the parties intended a mortgage transaction
rather than an installment land contract; i.e., there must have been
an intent to create a security, as construed
from the written agreement
4
and the surrounding circumstances.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's conclusion on the question of
intent may have a profound impact on the outcome of a case. 4 If
the court determines that the parties intended to create a mortgage,
both buyer and seller are bound by the terms of the bilateral contract;
a deficiency judgment and specific performance are thus available to
the seller, and the buyer is protected from forfeiture provisions, which
are unenforceable. 4 Conversely, an installment land contract is considered a unilateral contract, whereby an obligation is "unilaterally
placed on the seller only upon the occurrence of certain non-mandatory acts by the buyer. . .

. "4

This analysis not only limits the

seller's remedy to the enforcement of the forfeiture provision, 47 but
also prevents application of the doctrine of equitable conversion, which
is inapplicable to the unilateral contract. 48 Of course, the role of the

Consequently, she forfeited not only all the installments made, but the money she
had invested in improvements.
King, supra note 28, at 72.
40. BA TER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE app. 10A at 10-63 (1988).
41. See Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. Reb, Inc., 577 P.2d 645 (Wyo. 1978); Baldwin v.
McDonald, 156 P. 27 (1916).
42. George Santini, Casenote, Real Estate Finance-Installment Land Sale Contracts:
Avoiding The Harshness of Forfeitures. Barker v. Johnson, 591 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1979), 15
Land & Water L. Rev. 773, 776 (1980). See also Quinlin v. St. John, 201 P. 149 (Wyo. 1921).
43. Metropolitan Mortgage & Sec. Co. v. Belgarde, 816 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 1991)(quoting
Cliff & Co., Ltd. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595, 601 (Wyo. 1989)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 873. See also Olds v. Little Horse Creek Cattle Co., 140 P. 1004 (1914).
47. Metropolitan, 816 P.2d at 872. This reasoning is based on the notion that remedies
such as specific performance or damages for breach are the products of the mutually binding
bilateral contract, and are inapplicable to the unilateral contract. Id.
48. Olds, 140 P. at 1007. The doctrine of equitable conversion
determines in equity the rights of the parties . . . and the rule is itself but the consequence of the familiar doctrine of the courts of equity that for many purposes
things to be done are treated as if they were actually done, and necessarily refers
to a valid contract - one binding upon both parties, containing not only an obligation
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parties' intent is not limited solely to determining whether an installment land contract is unilateral or bilateral; intent is also critical
in the resolution of disputes regarding the construction and application of contracts in general. 49 Because the rules of contract interpretation play a pivotal role in the resolution of any contract dispute
regarding property, including the installment land contract, we now
turn to an examination of the rules of contract interpretation in
Wyoming.
Contract Interpretation In Wyoming
The rules of contract interpretation in Wyoming are well
established 0 and often repeated.-" The primary rule of contract interpretation in Wyoming was concisely stated in True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp.: "The determination of the parties'2 intent is our prime
focus in construing or interpreting a contract.1
The Wyoming Supreme Court's method of determining intent
can be summarized as follows. If the agreement between the parties
is in writing, and if the language is clear and unambiguous,5 3 the
court will focus on the language of the contract.5 4 Accordingly, the
scope of the court's examination will generally not extend beyond
the four corners of the agreement."
On the other hand, if the court finds the contract to be ambiguous, the intent of the parties may be determined by extrinsic evidence.5 6 This evidence may include the context in which the contract

on the part of the vendor to convey upon payment of the purchase price, but an
obligation on the part of the vendee to purchase and pay the money, and has no
reference to a mere option to purchase or to complete the purchase.
Id. (emphasis added).
Equitable conversion, in many cases, allocates the risk of loss to realty during the executory
stage of a land transaction (the period between execution of a contract and transfer of title)
to the buyer. See Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Risk of Loss by Casualty Pending Contract
for Conveyance of Real Property- Modern Cases, 85 A.L.R. 4th 233, 238 (1991). For a discussion of whether the doctrine of equitable conversion should be applied to the installment
land contract, see in re Estate of Ventling, 771 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1989).
49. True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 790 (1989).
50. Id. at 790.
51. State v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 978 (Wyo. 1988).
52. 771 P.2d 781, 790 (Wyo. 1989), (citing State v. Moncrief, 720 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1986));
Amoco Production Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980).
See also State v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 978 (Wyo. 1988)(The purpose of interpretation
or construction of any contract is to ascertain the true intent of the parties.)
53. "An ambiguous contract is one 'which is obscure in its meaning because of indefiniteness of expression or because of a double meaning being present."' True Oil Co. v. Sinclair
Oil Corp., 771 P.2d at 790 (quoting Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1987)).
54. Nelson v. Nelson, 740 P.2d 939, 940 (Wyo. 1987).
55. Rouse v. Munroe, 658 P.2d 74, 77 (Wyo. 1983). See also Hoist v. Guynn, 696 P.2d
632, 634 (Wyo. 1985).
56. True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d at 790.
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was written, including the subject matter and purpose of the contract. 7 The use of context as an aid in interpretation is strictly limited,
however, to ascertaining intent, and cannot be used "to contradict
the clear meaning of the language used.""8
As indicated above, these rules appear frequently in Wyoming
contract case law. While space does not permit a discussion of numerous specific cases, perhaps one example will serve to illustrate the
typical application of the rules discussed above. The case that follows
is factually unrelated to McKone; however, the legal principles are
analogous.
In Rouse v. Munroe,59 the parties asked the Wyoming Supreme
Court to construe the terms of a contract relating to an easement.
The original agreement allowed Rouse, the owner of the dominant
estate, to build a dam, which upon completion, would "cause water
in the reservoir to be upon a portion of the land of ... [Munroe]
.. estimated at approximately 10 acres, more or less." 6° A separate
clause in the contract stated that the "high water level of said dam
will be seventeen (17) feet above the creek bottom at the dam site
,,61 After the dam was constructed and the reservoir was filled,
....
Munroe discovered that instead of inundating the ten acres as estimated in the agreement, the dam actually inundated 15.2 acres. Munroe brought suit to enjoin Rouse from flooding any more than ten
acres of his land, arguing that this was the amount agreed to in the
contract. Predictably, Rouse responded that the clause referring to
the seventeen foot water level controlled the dispute, and that the
contract's reference to ten acres was simply an estimate. 62
Both parties argued that the easement agreement was clear on
its face, and that the intent of the parties could be determined within
the four corners of the contract.6 The court disagreed, stating, "[firom
our viewpoint, the language contained in the easement agreement can
Given this double meaning, we believe it
be read in two ways ....
is necessary to resort to extrinsic evidence in order to determine the
actual intent of the contracting parties.'6
The court then examined evidence presented by Rouse that at
the formation of the contract, neither party cared about how much
57. State v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 978 (Wyo. 1988) (citing Cheyenne Mining &
Uranium Co. v. Federal Resources Corp., 694 P.2d 65 (Wyo. 1985); Dawson v. Meike, 508
P.2d 15 (Wyo. 1973)).
58. State v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 978 (Wyo. 1988).
59. 658 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1983).
60. Id. at 76. The original agreement was between Rouse and Munroe's predecessor in
title. Id.
61. Id. at 76.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 78.
64. Id.
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land would be inundated, but that both parties were "more than
happy to have the water" as a dependable supply of water for stock. 6
The court also discussed the use of the words "more or less" as used
to described the amount' ' of flooded acreage, and held that clause was
"merely an estimation. 6 The court concluded, "[r]ead together, the
provisions . . . contemplate the creation of an easement for the formation of a reservoir with a high-water level of seventeen feet ...
The intent of the parties was to provide for a source of stock water
rather than to grant an easement for a specified number of acres." 6 7
The court's analysis in Rouse is typical of the analysis applied
in disputes requiring contract interpretation. The Rouse court stated
this succinctly when it observed: "[AII we must do in this case is
determine the intent of the parties as embodied in the instrument,
just as we are asked to do in any other case involving the construction
of a contract."8 This statement sets the stage for an examination of
McKone v. Guertzgen.69
PRINCnL CASE
In McKone v. Guertzgen, McKone asked the Wyoming Supreme
Court to determine "[w]hether the District Court erred when it looked
beyond the Contract for Deed to determine the responsibilities of the
parties as to [sic] Fire Marshal's request to remove underground fuel
storage tanks?" 70 In essence, McKone's appeal asked the court to
examine the language of the installment land contract to determine
clear to assign responsibility for
whether its terms were sufficiently
7 I
removal of the fuel tanks .
McKone based his appeal on the threshold premise that the terms
of the contract were clear and unambiguous, thereby requiring the
court to apply the terms as written. 72 Accordingly, McKone argued,
"[tihe responsibilities of the parties should first be determined from
the four corners of their contract. 7 He then directed the court's
attention to what he called a "very specific ' 74 clause in the agreement

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 79.
68. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
69. 811 P.2d 728 (Wyo. 1991).
70. Id. at 729. McKone presented other issues, which were not reached by the court and
thus are irrelevant to this discussion. See supra note 21.
71. Brief of Appellant. supra note 1,at 3.
72. McKone cited Rainbow Oil Co. v. Christmann, 656 P.2d 538 (Wyo. 1982) and Arnold
v. Mountain West Farm Bureau. Mut. Ins. Co., 707 P.2d 161 (Wyo. 1985) as support for his
premise.
73. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1,at 3.
74. Id. McKone also alluded to "an entire paragraph which states that the seller ... is
not to be liable to anyone for anything that affects the property sold." Id.
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that required the Guertzgens to pay all repair bills in connection with
the property.75 McKone reasoned that the removal of the fuel tanks
was a "repair" consistent with the specific terms of the agreement,
and that the Guertzgens should therefore pay to have the tanks removed.7 6
Citing Fuchs v. Goe, 77 the Guertzgens responded that "agreements to make repairs do not make a party an insurer." ' 78 They also
argued that "the removal of underground storage tanks is more than
just a repair. The'79removal of storage tanks is a major improvement
to the property."
The majority, without further explanation, found that the provisions cited by McKone did not address the "particular contingency"
(the removal of the fuel tanks) and looked "elsewhere" to determine
responsibility for removal of the tanks. 80 The court then examined
McKone's alternative contention that the Guertzgens "best fit the
Code's"' definition of the person responsible for the abandoned
tanks." 12 The majority acknowledged that the Guertzgens fit the Code's
definition of owner because "their equitable interest in the property
is also a contingent interest, which the code includes under the definition of owner.''83 However, they held that McKone also fit the
code's definition of owner, since according to the agreement, he was
to hold the title until all payments had been made. 8" The court also
concluded that "[ulntil there has been a conveyance of the warranty
deed, McKone continues to hold legal title and remains the legal owner
of the property." 8
Having held that both the Guertzgens and McKone were the owners of the property according to the Uniform Fire Code, the court
turned to the language "or other person responsible for the condition
or violation" found in Uniform Fire Code section 3.102 to determine

75. Id. The clause referred to by McKone reads:
Buyer agrees to keep and maintain said real property and the improvements thereon
in a good condition, and does agree to pay all utilities as the same become due and
to pay all repair bills and other bills in connection with the said real property, whereby
no liens can accrue or be filed against said real property.
Id. exhibit A para. 4.
76. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.
77. 163 P.2d 783 (Wyo. 1945).
78. Brief of Appellee at 5, McKone v. Guertzgen, 811 P.2d 728 (Wyo. 1991)(No. 90247).
79. Id.
80. McKone, 811 P.2d at 730.
81. See supra note 24.
82. McKone, 811 P.2d at 730.
83. Id. See supra note 24.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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who was "responsible for the condition or violation." 8 6 The court
concluded that based on this language, "who owned the property
when the tanks were abandoned is an important factor in fixing the
liability for removal" of the tanks."
The court then focused on what they called "a confusingly worded
stipulation, '" wherein the parties agreed that "prior to May 9, 1981,89
the underground storage tanks had been decommissioned by a prior
Contract for Deed person, not the the [sic] Plaintiff or the Defendant,
and have not been in use since that time."' 9 The court interpreted
this to mean that McKone was the vendor of the property when the
tanks were abandoned under a previous installment land contract.
The court conceded: "It may be that the person most responsible for
the abandonment of the tanks (the previous purchaser under contract
for deed) is not a party to this action. Nonetheless" the court concluded, "given the facts and the parties now before us, we hold that
McKone is the party responsible for the removal of the tanks because
he was the owner of the property when they were abandoned." 9
In dissent, Justice Urbigkit argued that the Guertzgens bought
the property "as is, where is", and that no warranties existed to place
responsibility on McKone for the removal of the tanks.9 Urbigkit
charged that the majority assessed responsibility with an incomplete
record which did not accurately advise when the filling station usage
was discontinued or necessarily who owned the property at the time. 93
He also dissented in disinclination to "continue the fiction of ownership derived from the antiquated differentiation between a note and
mortgage security interest and the installment sale contract as another
real estate purchase price security device. [He] would just abandon
the artificiality of the fiction, no matter how long matured in legal
dialogue.'"" Justice Urbigkit concluded that the "owner" of the
premises should be the person with the right to possess the property,
as opposed to the holder of the security device for payment of purchase money. 9"
Justice Golden also dissented, arguing that the terms of the contract were unambiguous, and that while the specific provisions cited
86. Id. This portion of the Uniform Fire Code reads: "Any order or notice issued or
served as provided in this code shall be complied with by the owner, operator, occupant or
other person responsible for the condition or violation to which the .order or notice pertains."
Uniform Fire Code Sec. 3.102 (1979)(emphasis added).
87. McKone, 811 P.2d at 730.
88. Id.
89. This was. the day the installment land contract was signed by the parties. Id.
90. McKone, 811 P.2d at 730.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 731 (Urbigkit, C.i., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Id.at 732 (footnote omitted).
95. Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1993

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 28 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVIII

by McKone did not allocate the removal costs to the Guertzgens,
those provisions "evidence the intent of the parties that the Guertzgens would shoulder all responsibilities connected with the property
when they assumed possession." 96 Golden also argued that the contract assigned responsibility for compliance with laws to the Guertzgens "where it states that buyer agrees to purchase and take the
property SUBJECT TO easements, reservations and restriction of record and to Zoning and other laws." 97
ANALYsIs
When property is transferred from seller to buyer subject to an
installment land contract, who bears responsibility for bringing the
land into compliance with laws which arise after the agreement is
entered into but before the final payment has been made? Unfortunately, the law in Wyoming remains confusing and unsettled regarding this issue.
In McKone, the majority had an ideal opportunity to clarify the
law in this area. Instead, the majority avoided this critical issue with
a formalistic interpretation of a phrase from the Uniform Fire Code.
In so doing, the court overlooked the basic premise of contract interpretation as established by Wyoming case law: "The determination
of the parties' intent is our prime focus in construing or interpreting
a contract." 98 The following is an analysis of the MeKone case in
light of Wyoming case law regarding contract interpretation.
Intent Of The Parties
As noted above, when a dispute arises requiring the court to
interpret a contract, the goal of the court is to ascertain the true
intent of the parties.99 When the writing is unambiguous, the intention
of the parties is to be ascertained from the words of the agreement.y
Further, when establishing the parties' intent, the writing should be
examined in its entirety. This should include an analysis of the various
parts of the contract, taking into account relationships and interplay
between the various parts.10 In analyzing the agreement in McKone,
the majority made no inquiry into the intention of the parties as to
who should bear responsibility for an unanticipated event such as the

96. Id. at 733 (Golden, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (emphasis in original).
98. True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 790 (Wyo. 1989).
99. State v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 979 (Wyo. 1988).
100. True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 790 (Wyo. 1989) (citing Nelson
v. Nelson, 740 P.2d 939, 940 (Wyo. 1987)).
101. Id.
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removal of the fuel tanks. 10An examination of the McKone contract
illustrates the important role that such an inquiry might have played
had it been properly made.
The McKone Contract
In his dissent, Justice Golden brought to light what is perhaps
the most persuasive single provision indicating an intention that
Guertzgens should bear the responsibility of compliance with laws
affecting the property: "The agreement assigns this responsibility to
the Guertzgens where it states that buyer agrees to purchase and take
the property SUBJECT TO easements, reservations and restrictions
of record and to zoning and other laws." 0 3
While the provisions cited by McKone regarding the Guertzgen's
obligation to "pay all repair bills and other bills in connection with
said real property"1' 4 are not conclusive standing alone, when considered in relationship to the various other parts of the agreement,
they lend strength to Justice Golden's dissent. The existence and repetition of different individual clauses assigning responsibility to the
Guertzgens for various future and unforeseeable occurrences lends
strength to an argument that the parties mutually intended the Guertzgens to assume liabilty for problems such as the removal of the tanks.
For example, all taxes levied against the property were to be paid by
the Guertzgens. l°5 In addition, a separate clause requires the Guertzgens to "purchase and maintain insurance" on the property for protection against "fire and other casualty."I' a Still another clause excuses
McKone from liability for injury to the buyer and or other persons
while on the property. '1 When considered along with the explicitly
102. McKone v. Guertzgen, 811 P.2d 728, 729-30 (Wyo. 1991). The majority's entire treatment of the issue of intent reads as follows:
McKone contends that the provisions in the parties agreement for repair and risk of
loss impose the responsibility for the removal of the tanks upon the Guertzgens.
Neither of these provisions, however, address this particular contingency. Thus, we
look elsewhere to determine the responsibility for the removal of the tanks.
Id. at 730.
103. Id. at 733 (Golden, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original). The full provision reads:
IN CONSIDERATION of the covenants and agreement of the respective parties
hereto, as hereinafter set forth, Seller agrees to sell and convey to Buyer, and Buyer
agrees to purchase and take from seller the following described real property, towit:[legal description of property] Town of Thermopolis, Hot Springs County, State
of Wyoming, together with the improvements thereon and appurtenances thereunto
pertaining, SUBJECT TO easements, reservations, and restrictions of record and to
Zoning and other laws ....

b

Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, exhibit A (emphasis in original).
104. Brief of Appellant, supra note I, exhibit A para. 4-5.
105. Id. para. 6. It seems clear that had local laws changed requiring a substantially higher
tax to be paid on the property, the Guertzgens would have been obligated under the agreement
to pay the higher tax rate.
106. Id. para. 12.
107. Id. para. 13.
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stated clause that the Guertzgens purchased the property subject to
local law, l'8 these provisions indicate the parties' intent that the
Guertzgens would bear responsibility for risk of loss to the property,
including the responsibility for compliance with local law.109 Further,
Guertzgen's counsel failed to point to any specific provision of the
agreement that might have assigned responsibility to McKone for the
removal of the tanks. Instead, their argument centered upon the language of the Uniform Fire Code, a statute completely unrelated to
the agreement of the parties and thus irrelevant as an indicator of
their intention. The language of the contract, when considered as a
whole, lends considerable weight to the argument that the parties
intended the Guertzgens to bear the financial burden of keeping the
property in compliance with local law. Additionally, a separate but
related analysis based on the terms of the contract might have established that the contract was an equitable mortgage, not an installment land contract. This analysis, while alluded to by Justice
Urbigkit in his dissent, was never addressed by the court. The following discussion outlines that analysis.
Intention Of The Parties: Installment Land Contract or Equitable
Mortgage?
As noted earlier," 0 the consideration of whether a transaction
constitutes an installment land contract or an equitable mortgage is
of critical importance in determining the rights and obligations of
the parties under a contract for the sale of land."' For example, if
the transaction is considered to be an equitable mortgage, the doctrine
of equitable conversion might apply." 2 This could have had profound
consequences on the court's decision as to who was the owner of the

108. See supra note 103.
109. In addition to the above, the majority's holding in McKone is potentially at odds
with the Uniform Vendor Purchaser Act and the law in other jurisdictions. See Rustic Hills
Shopping Plaza, Inc. v. Columbia Say. and Loan Ass'n., 661 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo. 1983),
where the Supreme Court of Colorado commented that "the purchaser under an installment
contract assumes the risk of loss and receives any appreciation in value." The Uniform VendorPurchaser Act states:
If, when either the legal title or possession of the subject matter of the contract has
been transferred, all or any part thereof is destroyed without the fault of the vendor
or is taken by eminent domain, the purchaser is not thereby relieved from a duty
to pay the price, nor is he entitled to recover any portion thereof that he has paid.
UNIF. VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK ACT § l(b), 14 U.L.A. 471 (1990). While this act applies
to destruction or taking by eminent domain, it is analogous to the burden of bringing land
into compliance with laws pertaining to property.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
111. See Cliff & Co. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595, 600-01 (Wyo. 1989). For example, assuming the court in McKone had examined the intent of the parties and determined that the
agreement was an equitable mortgage, the doctrine of equitable conversion could have been
applied. This likely would have been conclusive in establishing that Guertzgen was the "owner"
of the land and thus liable for bringing the land into compliance with the Fire Code.
112. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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land and thus who was responsible for bringing the land into compliance with the Fire Code. When called upon to make such a determination, a court is obligated to carefully examine the agreement
to determine the intent of the parties."' Under this reasoning, the
critical inquiry in McKone thus becomes: did McKone and Guertzgen
intend to create a relationship whereby an obligation was unilaterally
placed on McKone only upon the occurrence of certain non-mandatory acts by Guertzgen? Or, did the parties intend the contract to
be a bilateral agreement equivalent to a mortgage, either in law or
in equity, with4 the property providing a security device against a
binding debt? 1
While it is beyond the scope of this casenote to thoroughly examine the agreement of the parties in light of the installment land
contract versus equitable mortgage issue, it certainly deserves mention
that the analysis was never considered by the court. Posing the question serves to illustrate the complexity and depth of the task of interpreting an installment land contract. As difficult as the task may
be, fairness requires that the intent of the parties be determined in
assigning rights and obligations under the installment land contract.
The Wyoming Supreme Court deprived McKone of whatever benefit
he may have reserved for himself under the terms of the contract by
falling to consider the intent of the parties.
CONCLUSION

McKone serves as an illustration of the importance of the basic
rules of contract interpretation.
The installment land contract is a complex, controversial and
often misunderstood method of transferring land. By failing to observe and apply the rules of contract interpretation established by
Wyoming case law, the McKone majority ignored an opportunity to
clarify the law in this area. Indeed, the decision in McKone may have
made the issue of responsibility for compliance with laws under the
installment land contract more complicated. "The determination of
the parties' intent is our prime focus in construing or interpreting a
contract.""' 5 The wisdom of this doctrine is aptly emphasized by its
glaring absence in the McKone majority's opinion.
MICHAEL

L.

HOLDSWORTH

113. True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 790 (Wyo. 1989).
114. A similar inquiry was made three months later in the case of Metropolitan Mortgage
& Sec. Co. v. Belgarde, 816 P.2d 868, 873 (Wyo. 1991), based on the court's opinion in Angus
Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. Reb, Inc., 577 P.2d 645 (Wyo. 1978).
115. True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 790 (Wyo. 1989).
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